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POPULATION CONTROL IN JAPAN:
AN ECONOMIC THEORY AND ITS APPLICATION"
MARIiN BRONFENBRENNERt AND JOHN A. BunruKC
The so-called "classical" economists (Smith, Malthus, Ricardo, and their suc-
cessors) embedded an economic theory of population in their general economics of
growth and development.' With the "utility revolution" of the 187o's, however,
economists turned away from population problems, which passed largely by default
into the hands of the rising science of sociology.
A revival of interest in the economics of population has accompanied renewed
attention to the development problems of the less-developed areas within the last
generation and particularly since the end of World War II. Two representative con-
temporary American economists who have specialized on population problems are
Joseph J. Spengler' and Harvey Liebenstein?
Part one of the present paper is devoted to an elementary version (largely
diagrammatic) of a contemporary economic theory of population growth, with
population related as both cause and effect to the level of per capita income. Parts
two and three attempt to apply this analysis to Japan during its period of seclusion
* This paper is a product of the University of Minnesota Workshop in Economic Development,
conducted jointly by the writers. Professor Bronfenbrenner takes primary responsibility for institutional
material relating to Japan, and Professor Buttrick for theoretical material relating to population in
general. Both writers are economists with lily-white amateur standing in demography.
tA.B. 1934, Washington University; Ph.D. 1939, University of Chicago; Certificate in Japanese
Language 1944, United States Navy and University of Colorado. Professor of Economics, University of
Minnesota. Author, LONG-RANGE PROJECTIONS OF JAPANESE ECONOMY, 1962-1975 (1958). Contributor
to economics and population' periodicals.
t B.S. 1941, Haverford College; M.A. 1947, Ph.D. 195o, Yale University. Professor of Economics,
University of Minnesota. Author, [with H. F. Williamson] EcoNoMIC DEVELOPMENT: PRINCIPLES AND
PATTERNS (1954). Contributor to economics and population periodicals.
'For a "classical model" of economic growth, see BENJAMIN H. HIGGINS, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT:
PRINCIPLES, PROBLEMS, AND POLICIES ch. 3 (959). The present writers would modify the algebra of
Higgins's general equilibrium presentation at pp. 87-99.
' Spengler represents the "older generation" of American population economists. Two available
samples from his extensive bibliography are the chapter on Population Theory, in 2 B. F. HALEY (ED.),
SURVEY OF CONTEMPORARY ECONOMSICS 83 (1952), and the chapter on Demographic Patterns, in HAROLD
F. VLLIAMSON & JOHN A. BUtraCK (EDs.), ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: PRINCIPLES AND PATTERNS 63
(1954).
'Liebenstein represents the "younger generation" of American population economists. His major
contributions are embodied in' HARVEY LIEBENSTEIN, A THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEMOGRAPHc DEVELOP-
MENT esp. chs. 4, 5, and 6 (1954), and in EcoNomic BACKWARDNESS AND ECONOMIC GROwsIi esp. chs. 3,
so, and 14 (1957). The writers' formal argument has also been anticipated in part by Nelson, The
Low-Level Equilibrium Trap in Underdeveloped Countries, 46 AM. Ecov. REv. 894 (1956); Hagen,
Population and Economic Growth, 49 id. at 310, 36, esp. § II(0959).
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(the Tokugawa shogunate) and since its opening in I853 The primary stress of
part two is on the period prior to 1945, while part three concentrates on later develop-
ments.
AN EcoNomnc THEORY OF POPULATION GROWTH
A national economy may be regarded as a single gigantic firm producing a com-
posite output called "national income," with three composite inputs called "labor,"
"land," and "capital." At the outset, we suppose that the amounts of land (including
all natural resources) and capital (including all produced resources) are fixed; we
also suppose that the technology by which the flow of inputs is transformed into a
flow of output is unchanged. As a result, we may write a production function
Y = f(L), which indicates the relation between L (labor) and Y (national income).
As drawn on figure one, this function gives the appearance of increasing returns for
small values of L, since the ratio of output to input (Y/L) increases until L--Lo.
National
Income
Force
FIGuRE I
' This is not the first time that Japanese experience has been used to test population theories. For an
early attempt (incompletely successful, in our view) to apply the theory of "optimum population" to
Japan, see E. F. PENROSE, POPULATION THEORIES AND THEIR APPLICATION, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE To
JAPAN (1934).
'This discussion runs in terms of the average product of labor. Many economists prefer to dis-
tinguish between increasing, constant, and diminishing returns in terms of the marginal product of labor,
as measured by the slope of the production function or by the expression (dY/dL). See K. E. BouLDING,
EcoNomic ANALYSIS chs. 28, 34 (3 d ed. 1955); GEORGE J. STIGLER, THEORY OF PRICE ch. 7 (rev. ed.
1952).
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For larger values of L, the function gives the appearance of diminishing returns to
labor, since the ratio (Y/L) decreases as L rises.8
From the production function of figure one, it is easy to derive figure two. This
diagram relates population (n) and income per capita (Y/n), under the simplifying
assumption that an approximately constant fraction of the population is included in
the labor force at each level of (Y/n). The function drawn in figure two may be
written: (Y/n) = qy(n). It has its maximum value at no, which corresponds to L0 in
figure one. Any improvement in technology or increase in the supply of land and
capital will cause the function 0 to "shift upward," although its new position need
not parallel its old one.
Income
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Population
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FIGURE II
In addition to these production functions, evidence suggests the existence of
demographic relationships between population and income. Whereas it is natural to
view causation as running from population to income on the production side, it is
equally natural to view causation as running the other way on the demographic side.
The death rate (the number of deaths per iooo persons annually, either adjusted
or unadjusted for differences in age distribution) is probably related inversely to per
capita income. That is to say, the higher the per capita income, the lower the death
rate and the longer the life expectancy at any age. Some doubt arises as to this
proposition at the highest income levels; Americans in particular have been accused
eMarxists deny the relevance of the "law of diminishing returns" to labor. This is because they deny
that labor can, in fact, increase in quantity without accompanying increases in the quantity of land and
capital, not to mention improvements in the quality of labor and ir the technology available.
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of "digging their graves with their teeth." At lower levels, however, we use it
without hesitation.
The relationship of the birth rate to per capita income is more complicated,
and the evidence is understandably ambiguous. We shall however assume this
relationship to be as pictured in figure three. As income per capita increases from
extremely low levels, the birth rate also increases, partly because marriages take
place earlier and partly because more parents survive into and beyond their fertile
ages.7 Later, as incomes continue to rise, the population becomes more urbanized
and the birth rate falls. With improved sanitation, a smaller number of births
suffices to produce a given number of young adults. The prospect also opens up of
improving the quality of children by investment in their education The net cost
of raising children rises, while the income produced by children falls. Finally, at
still higher levels of income, families can afford to pass much of the drudgery of
child-raising to others, while retaining the pleasures themselves. Furthermore,
families are able to provide "advantages" for larger numbers of children. The birth
rate tends, accordingly, to increase once more.
Summarizing bluntly: Children may be viewed as both consumers' and producers'
goods. As consumers' goods, we should normally expect more to be "purchased" as
income rises; however, this simple statement assumes the "quality" of children to be
constant. With urbanization and higher incomes, however, the relative cost of
'We should not forget another relation involving causation in the opposite direction. A high birth
rate acts with a relatively short lag to increase the child labor supply, which increases income.
R At the same time, humanitarian folkways develop to diminish the amount of child labor mentioned
in the preceding note, and to increase the lag between the child's birth and his availability on the labor
market.
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improving quality (by additional education, better food and clothing, etc.) rises as
the standards for a "minimal" socially acceptable child improve. With a still
higher per capita income and a generally affluent society, the productivity of ex-
penditures on education, etc., decreases at the margin,9 and increases in number
become more attractive than increases in quality.'0
When children are viewed as producers' goods, the situation is otherwise. In an
underdeveloped agricultural society, children are cheap to manufacture and likewise
productive. They help with the harvest and participate in cottage industry while
still young. They assure their parents secure old age as adults. With industrializa-
tion and the shift to small "nuclear" families, children serve less well as social security
at the same time that they become more expensive to produce and shelter. Their
productivity to their parents falls not only because of laws and taboos against child
labor, but because of children's greater independence in adult life. On these grounds,
industrialization should result in a steady lowering of the birth rate.
Combining the two halves of this analysis, we should expect the birth rate to
rise with per capita income until agriculture loses its dominant position in the
economy. Then birth rates should fall with urbanism and industrialization until
per capita income rises enough to bring about an affluent society and a reversal of
the urban trend.'1
Figure three puts these arguments in diagrammatic form, showing both the birth
rate B and the death rate D as functions of per capita income (Y/n). Writing y for
Y/n, we find that at incomes below yi, deaths will exceed births and the population
will vanish with the passage of time. Incomes between yi and y2, and likewise
incomes larger than ys, will generate increasing populations in which the per-
centage of young people is relatively large. Incomes between y2 and ya, however,
will generate excesses of deaths over births, population will decline, and the per-
centage of old people will be relatively large. Stationary populations are consistent
with incomes of yi, y2, or ya. The lowest of these, yi, may be defined as the
Malthusian "subsistence level" of per capita income. There is, however, no con-
9In an affluent society, even a minimal education suffices as reasonable assurance of a satisfactory
income level for children and "vicarious consumption" by parents, as witness the steady fall of the
"white-collar differential" in the United States labor market. This is a major cause of the declining
marginal productivity of expenditures aimed at improving the quality of children in such a society.
"The essentially rational view of children as consumption goods contrasts with that of W. W.
Rostow. who uses similar terminology. Rostow suggests that the recent rises in birth rates have
occurred "as Americans (and others in societies marked by high mass consumption) have appeared
to seek in larger families, values beyond those afforded by economic security and by an ample supply of
durable consumers goods and services." And again, ". . what to do when the increase in real income
itself loses its charm? Babies; boredom; three-day weekends; the moon; or the creation of new inner,
human frontiers in substitution for the imperatives of scarcity?" Rostow, The Stages oj Economic Growth,
12 Ecomr. HisT. REv. (2d ser.) i, at 3 (1959). Since Rostow's concept of consumption is more restricted
than ours, the difference between us may be largely verbal.
" Statements about the influence of urbanism on population are difficult to test. We use the term
as excluding the suburban "bedrooms," which are often equal in size to small cities and are treated as
"urban" in conventional census statistics. White Plains and Evanston are American-Musashino and
Nishinomiya, Japanese-examples of communities that require reclassification for statistical verification
of our statements.
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nection between this notion and the relatively useless notion of biological subsistence.
Economic subsistence income, like Ricardo's "natural rate of wages," is merely the
lowest per capita income associated with a stationary population.
The birth and death rate functions presented on figure three will presumably
shift with changes in technology or mores. Improvements in medical knowledge
will lower the death rate associated with each level of per capita income. Improve-
ments in contraception or increases in urbanization (uncorrelated with income)
would probably have the same effect on the birth rate associated with each level of
income.
Income Income
per.Copita per Copita
0 Birth and 0l na f)3  nj nz n,
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FIGURE IV
Our next step is to combine these two strains: (a) birth and death rates as
functions of per capita income, and (b) per capita income as a function of popula-
tion. This is attempted in figure four, a diagram that appears more complex
than the earlier three, since it requires two panels. The left panel, however, is
only figure three with its axes reversed, while the right panel is simply figure two..
Figure four shows six population levels (ni, n2, . .. , n6) that if achieved, maintain
themselves, both in the sense of a balance between births and deaths and in the
sense of producing income adequate for their maintenance. To these six equilibrium
populations, we should perhaps add a trivial seventh, the origin, with a zero popula-
tion. Only three of these six levels (or four if we include the origin), however,
can be regarded as stable.
With an initial population less than nl, income produced will be so small that
deaths will exceed births and the population will eventually vanish from the face of
the Earth. A population between ni and n2 will produce income such that births
will exceed deaths. The population will raise to n2. A population between n2 and
n3, on the other hand, will produce income such that deaths will exceed births and
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lower the population to n2. Therefore, we argue that level n2 is stable, while
levels nli and n3 are unstable. Small departures from level n2 will tend to correct
themselves, while small departures from nl or na will tend to augment themselves.
Similarly, a population between n3 and n will tend to settle at the stable level n4, and
a population in excess of n will tend to settle at the stable level no.
With each stable population level (n2, n4, no) is associated a correspondingly
stable level of per capita income (y2, ya, yi, respectively), so that we may speak of
stable pairs of points or stable solutions of our model. In order of population size,
these pairs or solutions are (n2, y2), (n4, y3) and (no, yi). They may be looked
upon as representing "underpopulation with underdevelopment," "adequate popula-
tion with adequate development," and "overpopulation with underdevelopment."
None of the three necessarily coincides with an "optimum" population, as will be
shown later.
Income
per Capita
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FIGUaR V
The next complication has already been mentioned briefly, and will have occurred
to many readers independently. The production functions Y = f(L) and y = y(n)
are normally rising over time, as technology improves and the capital stock in-
creases. This feature enters our diagrams with figure five, which reproduces the
right panel of figure four with four possible per capita production functions shown
separately. These are labeled a, b, c, and d; they are only representative samples
from the infinite family of possible functions. Each function is associated with a
different capital stock and a different technology, a being most primitive and d
most advanced. It is possible for production functions to cross, although they do
not do so on this diagram.
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So long as an a curve is in effect, the economy will eventually die out, because
the maximum per capita income possible with this production function is less than
the minimum income level yi at which the population will sustain itself. With a
b curve in effect, either a zero or a "subsistence" population may result; the "sub-
sistence" population is the level of n associated with income level y, at point P2, and
will be reached if population is initially above 01.12 A c curve will permit a stable per
capita income level of either yi or y2. A population that was initially sparse will
settle at point y2. A population that was initially dense will settle at point Y4. The
watershed or divide is at point 73.3' A Malthusian conclusion seems to follow in
this case; the stable income level Y2 corresponding to the smaller population is
larger than the stable income level yi corresponding to the larger population. Only
with a production function like d can the high per capita income y3 be maintained
(point 82). Even here, less favorable outcomes are possible if the initial population
level is either too low (below point 81) or too high (above point a3) 14
An "optimum" population, defined as that associated with a maximum per capita
income, has little analytical significance in this model. Only by coincidence would
an equilibrium population equal an optimum population, and it would be stable
in only one direction (upward).15 To argue convincingly in favor of attempts to
influence birth and death rates with an eye to achieving and maintaining this equality
would require value judgments of unusual strength and narrowness.
Before passing on to Japan, we present three other illustrations to which this
theory may be relevant:
i. The formation of the great deserts of Central Asia was perhaps reflected in a
fall of the per capita production function for nomadic agriculture from a b to an a-
type. This left the population no choice beyond extermination and migration.
The great barbarian invasions of the first milennium of the Christian Era have been
presented as possible results.
2. Colonial America may be thought of as having a b-type production function
and as being located somewhere to the right of Pi in figure five, with per capita in-
come somewhat in excess of yi. Births exceeded deaths, and population grew rapidly
(even disregarding immigration). Before the growth of population could pull per
capita income down to the yi or subsistence level, however, technological improve-
ments, capital formation, and the opening of new lands combined to replace a b by
a c-type production function. Continued immigration raised population somewhat
above the point indicated by (2 in figure five and per capita income somewhat above
y2. Shifts in the birth and death rate functions, particularly the latter, combined
with continued immigration to prevent any actual excess of births over deaths or
" Point P, corresponds to the unstable equilibrium point (n., yl) of fig. IV.
"'Point y3 corresponds to the unstable equilibrium point (n., y2 ) of fig. IV.
" Points 81 and 83 correspond, respectively, to the unstable equilibrium points (n3 , y3 ) and
(n5 Y2) of fig. IV.
"Points (n3 , y3 ) and (n1 , y3 ) of fig. IV would coincide at this optimum point. The first point is
unstable, the second stable.
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reduction in population. The rate of growth of population, however, declined,
as did the rate of growth of income. Fear was expressed of "economic maturity" or
"economic stagnation" as a result; 6 this would be interpreted in our diagrams as an
income contraction to y2. Before it occurred, however, further improvements
in technology and further accumulation of capital replaced the c-type production
function by a d-type function, creating the possibility of stable equilibrium at the
higher per capita income level y3. Present-day America may, in fact, be thought of
in our terms as located somewhat to the left of a2 on figure five. Income is higher
than ya, and population is increasing. But the effects of the population increase on
the income level will perhaps be offset by a continued rise in the production function.
Birth and
Death Rates
D B
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FIGURE VI
3. We can depict India and Pakistan as having had for centuries a production
function of the b-type and per capita income fluctuating about the subsistence level yi.
In terms of figure five, the Indian subcontinent was located close to point P2. As the
years passed, the production function has risen from a b to a c-type, but so slowly
that per capita income could not exceed yi. Population growth spread the gains
from productivity changes over more people, so that a subsistence level of income
persisted (points P2, y4). Replacing a c-type production function by a d-type
may also fail to raise per capita income rapidly enough to enable these countries to
escape the danger of equilibrium at 84, the so-called "low-level equilibrium trap."
"
0The standard expression of this apprehension is Alvin H. Hansen's 1938 presidential address to the
American Economic Association, Economic Progress and Declining Population Growth, 29 A1. EcoN.
Rav. I (r939), which is reprinted in GOrFRIED HAEERLER (ED.), READINGS IN BUSINESS CYCLE THEoay
366 (1944).
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Under these circumstances, a shift in the birth-rate function B provides a possible
avenue of escape. A change in mores such as will diminish the birth rate associated
with low incomes (shifting the birth-rate function from B to B' in figure six) offers
the possibility of reaching and maintaining per capita income levels of y2 or y3.
II
JAPANESE POPULATION: 1720-1945
Japanese population history following establishment of permanent contact with
the West in 1853 is more difficult to interpret in theoretical terms. From an em-
pirical point of view, the period since 1853 seems divisible into two subperiods,
divided by the disaster of World War II.
For perhaps 125 years prior to Commodore Matthew C. Perry's mission of 1853,
the Japanese population had remained constant at 26,ooo,ooo or 27,oooooo. An
estimate for 1721 gives a figure of 26,ooo,ooo, while an estimate for 1852 gives one of
only 27,200,oo0.17 This generally stable level rose in good crop years and fell in
bad ones. It also concealed wide disparities between individual fiefs or kuni, some
of which rose or fell by as much as twenty per cent in fifty-year periods.'8 Never-
theless, the period i72o-i85o in Japan is one of the longer and closer approaches to
stationary population equilibrium at a subsistence level found in recorded demo-
graphic history. In terms of the model presented in part one, changes in agri-
cultural technology dating from the century prior to I72o 9 were after that date
raising Japan's production function only gradually, and never enabled per capita
income to exceed for long what we have called a subsistence level.
The mechanism of population control under the Tokugawas is not without inter-
est. On the side of the birth rate, contraception and prostitution each played a
role. Abortion seems to have been prevalent in the large cities and infanticide in
the rural areas, although neither was so frequent as some sensational accounts
suppose. Infanticide, called mabiki or "thinning out," was performed by midwives
at the behest of the father or the head of the father's family. Its motive among the
peasantry was clearly economic. It was also practiced in the warrior or samurai
class, where its motive seems to have been the avoidance of economic life. Primo-
geniture assured samurai status (however poverty-stricken) for the oldest sons of
samurai families, but younger sons were in danger of degradation (however
"' IRENE B. TAEUBER, THE POPULATIO N OF JAPAN 20 et seq. (1958). More detailed estimates of
Tokugawa-era population (x8 in number) are collected in TAKuMA TERAo, AN OUTLOOK OF STUDIES ON
POPULATION PROBLEMS IN JAPAN, IV: OUTLINE OF BIRTH CONTROL MOVEMENT 3 (1959).
8 sTAEUBER, op. cit. supra note 17, at 24, map 3.
"This prior century was a period of peace and prosperity under the early Tokugawa shoguns, and
culminated in a minor population explosion. It was also marked by the improvements in agriculture
and handicrafts described as "the agrarian origins of modern Japan." Cf. T. C. SMITH, THE AGRARIAN
ORIGINS OF MODERN JAPAN esp. chs. 6-8 (1959).
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prosperous) to economic activity as members of lower classes. At any rate, the
eldest son and the first two or three children of any family faced little risk of mabiki.
Western contact set off a series of decreases in death rates and increases in pro-
ductivity. Birth rates fell less than proportionately to death rates, perhaps because
incomes were also rising. Population rose in a century from 27,ooo,ooo to 90,000,000,
as is shown in table one. Japan became, after Holland and Belgium, the world's
most densely populated country °
TABLE I
POPULATION AND ANNUAL GRowni RATES, SELECTED YEARS, JAPAN, 1875-1959 a
Population Annual Growth iRate
Year (millions) (per thousand)
1875 ..................... 35.6 8.9
1880 ..................... 37.0 8.6
1885 ..................... 38.5 5.9
1890 ..................... 40.3 8.7
1895 ..................... 42.0 10.5
1900 ..................... 44.4 11.7
1905 ..................... 47.0 9.0
1910 ..................... 49.9 13.6
1915 ..................... 53.5 14.1
1920 ..................... 55.4 13.2
1925 ..................... 59.2 17.5
1930 ..................... 63.9 15.6
1935 ..................... 68.7 13.5
1940b .................... 72.4 3.9
1944 ..................... 73.8 -22.9
1945 ..................... 72.2 49.9
1950 ..................... 83.2 15.6
1955 ..................... 89.3 11.5
1959 ..................... 93.0 ....0
NOTES: A Data prior to 1920 (from local records) are not comparable with later data (from national census e timates); Okinawa excldrd
after 1920. b Data for 1940 adjusted for troop movements.
. Not available.
SoUeCS: bxuE B. TAE=aca Tan POPULATION oF JAPAN 41, 60, 73 (1958); JAPANESE NAT'L COMM'N FoR UNESco, MANUAL ov DEuo-
oRAPEc STATISc rCS JAPAN 213 (1958); FAc'rs ABOUT Ti POPULATION OF JAPAN: LATEST DATA AND ANALTYSIS 1 (Mnichi Nowopap-
er, Population Problems Research Council Series No. 17, 1960).
Except for the interruption of World War II, Japanese economic productivity,
which we interpret as an upward shift of production functions, permitted the
Japanese real national income to rise more rapidly than the Japanese population.
Indeed, income per capita rose in index-number terms almost as rapidly as total
income until the onset of this war. Figures are shown in table two, although the
reader should note the imperfect comparability between prewar and postwar data.
Accompanying this income rise as both cause and effect has been a shift of the
Japanese labor force from primary industry (agriculture, forestry, fisheries) to
secondary industry (manufacturing, mining, and construction) and to tertiary in-
dustry (trade, services, finance, Government). Despite the mushroom growth of
2 0 Other exceptions, fot classified strictly as "countries," include the Ryukyus and Taiwan in Asia,
England and Wales in Europe, and Puerto Rico in North America. See KosEiH5 JiNx6MONnA! SIIINoI",
JINK56 HAKUSHO [POPULATION PROBLEMS INQUIRY COUNCIL, 'WELFARE MINISTRY, POPULATION NVhTsI
PAPER] 158-61, table 29 (959) [hereinafter cited as JINK5 HAKUSHO.]
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TABLE II
INDICES OF REAL INCOmE, SELECTED PERIODS, JAPAN, 1878-I956a
Real Income ProducedPeriod Total Per Capita
Index Numbers: 1928-82=100
1878-82 .................. 11.5 20.1
1883-87 .................. 14.6 24.3
1888-92 .................. 17.5 28.0
1893-97 .................. 23.3 35.6
1898-1902 ................ 30.1 44.0
1903-07 .................. 31.9 43.5
1908-12 .................. 39.5 51.0
1913-17 .................. 45.6 55.0
1918-22 .................. 58.2 66.8
1923-27 .................. 75.3 80.7
1928-32 .................. 100.0 100.0
1933-37 .................. 121.0 122.3
1938-42.2 .................. 151.3 132.2
Index Numbers: 1984-86=100
1950 ..................... 97.9 80.5
1952 ..................... 122.0 98.1
1954 ..................... 126.8 98.9
1956 ..................... 153.2 116.8
NOr: All data except 1950 and 1952 refer to calendar years; 1950 and 1952 fiscal years run from April 1 to March 31 of year following.
SOURCES: KazuM OHAWA r Au, Ts Gnowrn RATE OF TsE JsAxEss- EcoNomY SIncN 1878, at 18-20 (1957); J. B. COnEN, J AN's
PosTw.n EcoNomy 45 (1958).
total population, the gainfully occupied population in primary industry was smaller
in 1940 than in i88o, as is shown in table three. Demobilization and food shortages
after World War II have reversed temporarily this trend out of agriculture in abso-
lute, although not in percentage, terms. The increase in nonagricultural employment
is reflected in the rise of Japanese labor productivity. It is one of the principal
differences between the results of population growth in the Japanese and the
Indian settings. No one denies the existence of "disguised unemployment" in the
Japanese countryside, even in good times, particularly since World War H; but
such unemployment has not become in Japan the overpowering problem that it
has been in India.2 1
Correlated with this shift from agriculture to manufacturing and (particularly)
services has been a shift from rural areas to large cities. Detailed rural-urban break-
downs are available for the three years 1920, 193o, and 1955. During this interval
of approximately a generation, the percentage of the population in large cities or
si tripled; it was eighteen per cent in i9",o, twenty-four per cent in i93o, and 56.3
per cent in 1955. The percentage in the six largest cities alone rose from 9.8 to
11.8 to 15.9. In the five-year period i95o-55, nearly seventy per cent of the total
increase was attained by the prefectures including these six cities.22
2 Some Japanese authorities feel that "disguised unemployment" may become such a problem in the
mid-ig6o's, following a bulge in the working-age population, which, in turn, reflects the postwar baby
boom. For a summary of various Japanese estimates of the present magnitude of disguised unemploy-
ment, see SHIGETo Tsuau, ESSAYS ON JAPANESE ECONO.CY 85-90 (1958).2
"TAEUBER, Op. crt. stpra note 17, at 78; FAcrs ABOUT THE POPULATION OF JAPAN: LATEST DATA AND
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TABLE III
SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF GAINFULLY OCCUPIED POPULATION, JAPAN,
SELECTED PERIODS, x878-I958
(MILLIONS AND PERCENTAGES)a
Period Primary Secondary Tertiary Total
1878-82 ................. 16.1 (82.1) 1.1 (5.6) 2.4 (12.3) 19.5 (100.0)
1883-87 ................. 16.7 (78.8) 1.6 (8.5) 2.9 (13.7) 21.2 (100.0
1888-92................. 17.2 (76.1) 2.0 (8.9) 3.4 (15.0) 22.6 (100.0
1893-97 ................. 17.4 (73.1) 2.5 10.5) 3.9 16.4) 23.8 100.0
1889-1902............. 17.3 (70.0) 2.9 (11.8) 4.5 (18.2) 24.8 (100.0
1903-07 ................. 17.0 (66.4) 3.4 (13.3) 5.2 (20.3) 25.6 (100.0
1908-12 ................. 16.5 (63.0) 3.9 (14.9) 5.8 (22.1) 26.2 00.0
1913-17 ................. 15.7 (59.3) 4.3 (16.2) 6.4 (24.5) 26.5 100.0
1918-22 ................. 14.9 (54.7) 4.7 (17.3) 7.6 (28.0) 27.1 100.0
1923-27 ................. 14.8 (51.9) 4.9 (17.2) 8.8 (30.9) 28.4 100.0
1928-32 ................. 14.8 (50.5) 4.9 (16.7) 9.6 (32.8) 29.3 (100.0
1933-37 ................. 14.7 (47.7) 6.0 (19.5) 10.1 (32.8) 30.8 100.0)
1938-42 ................. 14.4 (44.7) 7.6 (23.6) 10.2 (31.7) 32.2 (100.0)
1947 .................... 17.8 (53.5) 7.4 (22.2) 8.1 (24.3) 33.3 (100.0)
1950 .................... 17.2 (48.3) 7.8 (21.9) 10.6 (29.8) 35.6 (100.0)
1955 .................... 16.1 (41.2) 9.3 (23.8) 13.7 (35.0) 39.2 (100.0)
1958b ................... 16.0 (37.1) 11.2 (26.0) 15.9 (36.9) 43.1 (100.0)
NoTra: a Figures are rounded and-may not add to totals.b Estimate for 1958 (Statistics Bureau, Office of Prime Minister) are not strictly comparable with other estimates (Census
Bureau, Ministry of Welfare).
Sovnacs: Kausus OmrwA ST A., TG Gnowa RATE or Tn JAPe.s Eeoomy Sn cz 1878, at 27 (157); XtErsi5 JsLO%'Uo.
D S.= Jm5 Raxusno [Popuose PaozLrus IeQvmr CouxcnWzuAn Mnessar, Poru.-on sm- PAPica] 3944 (1959).
Detailed analysis of population changes in terms of birth and death rates has
been possible in Japan since i9oo, with the exception of the war years. Both these
rates have trended downward since the i93o's, except for an immediate postwar
baby boom, which lasted from mid 1946 to early 1949. Despite a dramatic fall of
the Japanese death rate below that of many European nations, 23 the birth rate has
fallen yet more rapidly, so that the rate of natural increase has been declining.
Detail is shown in table four.
These results seem to conform to the following hypothesis regarding birth rates:
birth rates rise with income for each occupational and social group in the population,
along with expenditures for consumption goods generally. The birth rate of occu-
pational and social groups high in the social "pecking order" is, however, sig-
nificantly below the birth rate for groups of lower status, with the income variable
held constant. Those near the top of the social pyramid would be expected to
prefer fewer high-quality children to a larger quantity of the "standard product."
This is also true of their purchases of other "consumer goods." Hence, the shift in
the proportion of gainfully employed away from agriculture to higher-status urban
ANALYSIS 8 (Mainichi Newspapers, Population Problems Research Council Series No. 17, 596o). Figures
are not corrected for changes in the boundaries of local units or for the reclassification of urban places.
"While the Japanese crude death rate is below that of any European country except the Nether-
lands, this is partially attributable to the relative youth of the Japanese population. Japan's age-specific
death rate remains above that of the United States and France. Cf. Yuzo MoaRro, FACTS ABoTrr rI
PoPurLzror OF JAPAN 29-31 (Mainichi Newspapers, Population Problems Research Council Series No. 14,
1956).
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TABLE IV
CRUDE BsRTH, DEATH, AND NATURAL INCREASE RATES, JAPAN, SELECTED YEARS,
i9oo-1956 (PER THOUSAND)
Natural
Year Birth Death Increase
1900 ......................... 31.8 20.3 11.4
1905 ......................... 30.6 21.1 9.4
1910 ......................... 34.0 21.1 12.9
1915 ......................... 33.2 20.1 13.1
1920 ......................... 36.3 25.4 10.9
1925 ......................... 35.0 20.3 14.7
1930 ......................... 32.4 18.2 14.2
1935 ......................... 31.7 16.8 14.9
1940 ......................... 29.0 16.2 12.7
1947 ......................... 34.3 14.6 19.7
1950 ......................... 28.1 10.9 17.2
1953 ......................... 21.5 8.9 12.6
1956 ......................... 18. 8.0 10.4
1957 (preliminary) ............ 17.2 8.0 8.9
Souncrs: J3Aez NAY'L COMM'x FOR U.emsco, MANUAL 0 DRMoaAsxmc STATiSTCs 5N JAePAN 229 (1958); Muioau TACM, POPULA-
T10X Nonmis Op ToDAY 3 (1958).
occupations, which has been a feature of development in Japan as elsewhere, reduces
birth rates if income stays constant. An increase in per capita income unaccom-
panied by such an occupational shift tends, however, to increase birth rates. In
Japan, the effect of the occupational shift on the birth rate has, since the i92o's,
prevailed over the effect of rising incomes. This dominance is likely to continue
over the next decade or generation, but may not do so if Japan reaches a state of
genuine affluence.
In terms of the economics of population, as outlined in part one, the Japanese
record is that of a country approaching a population equilibrium considerably above
the subsistence level by means of a lowering of both birth and death rates. Four
authoritative Japanese population projections of the i95o's also point in this direction.
The maxima anticipated during the i98o's apparently lie somewhat to the right of
points like ya on figure five, at the intermediate income level y2. The projections
themselves are summarized as table five. 4 If our equilibrium analysis is valid, the
decreases anticipated for the period 895-ooo represent an approach to equilibrium
by damped oscillations.25 Of the four projections, the latest efforts (1955, 1957) have
semi-official status and are available in greatest detail, including estimates at annual
intervals from 1955 to 1975 and at five-year intervals from 1975 to 2oi5.
" The projection techniques used by contemporary Japanese demographers are presented in JAPANESE
NAT'L COMM'N FOR UNESCO, MANUAL OF DEmOGRAPHIC STATISTIcs IN JAPAN 176-86 (1958). These seem
somewhat mechanical atfd might be improved by more attention to variables such as income and urbani-
zation.
" See W. J. BAUmOL, ECONOmIC DY'rAucs ch. io (2d ed. 1959).
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TABLE V
FOUR PROJECTIONS OF JAPANESE POPULATION, 1960-2000 (MILLIONS)
Tachi Takagi
Year Projection Projection Welfare Ministry Projections
(1952) .(1953) (1955) (1957)
1960 ............ 92.9 93.2 93.2 93.4
1970 ............ 100.3 99.8 96.3 99.6
1980 .... :....... 106.4 105.6 103.1 104.6
1990 ........... 108.0 107.1 106.9 104.2
2000 ............ 106.4 105.0 106.4 101.4
SouRc,: IPz B. Tsmm, THE PoPuLATioN oF JAPAN 386 (1958); KSsnisa5 J3mnSsoao Kzzxmysno, D~wo-NENrBI-Bu
Sunm Jn,. [INsrrnuor o PoPuLATrON PaRoBs, WELPAnE Mrmsry, Rtzaa:cu BULL. No. 118, PoPuLAT o N PNojr.os By Aoz
so SEx] 27 (1959).
III
JAPANESE PoPULATIoN: 1945 to DATE
A controversial issue in Japanese demography is the interpretation of the record
since 1945, and particularly since i95o. The conventional view presents this period
as a sharp break with the past. Certainly, the declines of birth and death rates
since i95o are sharper than expected from the extrapolation of prewar trends.2 0 Cer-
tainly also, the decline in the birth rate has been accompanied by an active popula-
tion-control movement. Thus, we find the Japanese demographer Kitaoka asserting:
"In world population history, there is found no such drastic decrease in the birth
rate as in recent Japan.""ar The American demographer Thompson, who has had
Japanese experience, assesses the significance of the alleged break with the past even
more highly.2
The rapid acceptance of birth control by the Japanese people is one of the most encouraging
events of recent times. It leads one to hope that other countries will follow Japan's example
in attempting to make a rational adjustment of population to the resources available for its
support.
Our own view, perhaps reflecting a "theoretical" bias, considers the postwar
Japanese population record as, at most, a minor acceleration of trends already in
progress. It considers the family-limitation movement as little more than the con-
spicuously visible instrument of one such trend, much as the trade-union movement
was in many countries in the late i94o's the conspicuously visible instrument of
adjusting money wage rates to inflation arising from wartime monetary expansion-
an adjustment that would have almost certainly come about with no such movement
in existence.'
2 8 Mrs. Tacuber illustrates this point graphically. See TAEauRE, op. cit. supra note 7, at 365, fig. 27.
2
'JurTsu KITAOKA, OVsER-POPULATION AND FAMILY PLANNING IN JAPAN I (Science Council of Japan,
Division of Economics and Commerce, Economic Series No. 14, 1957).
"WARREN S. THOMPSON. POPULATIO; AND PROGRT'-S IN TIlE FAR E.ST 7 (g6o).
" This interpretation of the role of the trade union movement is expressed most strongly in Friedman,
Some Comments on the Significance of Labor Unions for Economic Policy, in D. McC. Wsoiirr (ED.),
THE Impcr oF THE UNION ch. io (1951); Morton, Trade Unionism, Full Employment, and Inflation, 40
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In this essay, we limit ourselves largely to an account of the major policy decisions
in Japan affecting the Japanese population, at least in the short run, during the
postwar period. The account begins with the Allied Occupation of 1945-52 and con-
tinues with the recovery of Japanese sovereignty in 1952. The reader may decide
for himself the proper interpretation of the accompanying changes in the population
and in its rate of growth.
Occupation policy started its erratic career in virtual disregard of the Japanese
population problem. This is not surprising, in that this problem had been used
by the Japanese military as justification for imperialist expansion on the Asian
continent and in the South Pacific. Two early Occupation policies, however com-
mendable on other grounds, accordingly, exacerbated Japan's population crisis during
the period of most severe postwar shortages and inflation (1945-48). These were
the repatriation and public health programs.
Overseas Japanese to the number of 6,25i,ooo, approximately evenly divided
between civilian and military personnel and concentrated in fertile ages, were com-
pulsorily repatriated to Japan from continental Asia and the Pacific over the period
of the Occupation. 0 A partial offset was the voluntary emigration from Japan of
I,i95,ooo aliens, mainly Korean conscript laborers returning home.!' The net
"social increase" was, therefore, 5,056,00o over the entire Occupation, 3,68i,ooo in
1946 alone32 The concentration of young men in their twenties among these re-
patriates was one important cause of the postwar baby boom.
At the same time, a vigorous public health program was inaugurated by the
Occupation; it has been extended by the Japanese Government. It not only avoided
major postwar epidemics, but reduced (with the aid of antibiotics) the traditionally
high Japanese death rates from tuberculosis and other respiratory ailments. It also
reduced infant mortality rates, particularly from contagious diseases; this reduction,
combined with the baby boom, has given present-day Japan its remarkably youthful
population concentration. Table six indicates some striking changes in death rates,
while table seven shows the resulting increase in life expectancy at birth.
Before we consider Occupation policy toward family limitations, a thumbnail
sketch of the family-limitation movement prior to 1945 may be in order 38 We have
seen that abortion and infanticide were important elements in stabilizing the
Japanese population during the period i720-i85o, despite periodic legislation against
them by individual feudal lords. They survived well after the Meiji Restoration of
1867 in rural areas; voluntary associations were campaigning against mabiki in
AM. EcoN. REV. 13 (195o); Rees, Postwar Wage Determination in the Basic Steel Industry, 41 Am. EcoN.
REV. 389 (1951).
" For a breakdown into civilian and military categories, and also into areas from which repatriation
took place, see TAEUBER, op. cit. supra note 17, at 346.
"KrroKA, op. cit. supra note 27, at 12. A large fraction of the former Korean residents are
believed to have re-enstered Japan illegally after Korean economic prospects were dimmed by partition and
civil war. Currently (1959-6o), there is a small return flow to North Korea under communist auspices.
Ibid.
"This resume follows KrrAOKA, op. cit. supra note 27, at 43 et seq.
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TABLE VI
JAPANESE DrATH RATES, SELECTED CAUSES AND YEARS, 1920-1956 (PER THOUSAND)
Tuberculosis Pneumonia, Infant
Year All Causes (all forms) Bronchitis Mortalitya
1920 ................ 25.4 2.24 4.07 166.2
1925 ................ 20.3 1.94 2.75 142.8
1930 ............... 18.2 1.85 2.00 124.5
1935 ................ 16.8 1.90 1.86 107.1
1940 ................ 16.2 2.10 1.82 90.4
1947................. .14.6 1.87 1.75 76.7
1948 ................. 11.9 1.80 0.99 61.7
1949 ................ 11.6 1.69 1.00 62.5
1950.......... ...... 10.9 1.46 0.93 60.1
1951 ................ 9.9 1.10 0.82 57.5
1952 ................ 8.9 0.82 0.67 49.4
1953 ................ 8.9 0.67 0.71 48.9
1954 ................ 8.2 0.62 0.55 44.6
1955 ................ 7.8 0.52 0.48 39.8
1956 ................ 8.0 0.49 0.48 40.6
1957 ................ 8.3 .... b .... b 40.0
1958 ................ 7.4 .... b .... b 34.6
Nor: * Deaths .er 1600 live btrtLs.
b Not available.
SouRez: JAPANmSI NAT'r Coum,'x FOR UNESCO, MAN UAL OF Dr.ooiurc STATISTICS IN JAPAN 229, 236 d ceq. (1958): Klsrnsa5
Jmhx 5MoDAi SuxrKA, Jerx 5 HAxuSHO [PoPUaATION' PROBLEMS INQUIRY COUNC11,1WELVARE MINISTRY, POPUJATtO{ Wsrrn PAPEn]
142 (1959).
TABLE VII
LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH, JAPAN, SELECTED YEARS, 1920-57 (YEARS)
Period Male Female
1920-24 ................ 42.06 43.20
1925-29 ................ 44.82 46.54
1935-36 ................ 46.92 49.60
1947 ................... 50.06 53.96
1950-51 ................ 57.91 61.09
.1954-55 ....... ....... 62.80 66.79
1956-57................ 63.02 67.12
SouacEs: I Exr B. TAEuBER, Th POPULATION or JAPAN 288 (1958); JAPANEsE NAT'L CoaM'e ToP UNESCO, b1ANUAI or DEMO-
ONaPrIC SrTAs'Tics IN JAPAN 240 (1958) (this latter source includes life tables).
particular as late as the i88o's and x89o's, 4 as not fitting for the civilized and
modern nation that Japan aspired to become. Following a period of general un-
concern with the population problem-save for concern regarding Japan's small size
vis-a-vis China and Russia-concern with overpopulation seems to have revived
with the Kome-sddo or rice riots following World War V. Birth-control agitation
on the western model began shortly thereafter, subject to the intermittent suspicion
of the military and the police. Mrs. Margaret Sanger was prohibited from lecturing
"' Information supplied the writers by Morris D. Morris.
"JINK5 HAKUsHO 3 et seq. TERSo, op. dt. supra note 17, at 8-11, gives an account of the resulting
controversy. Japan's agricultural output, which had approximately kept pace with total income through
the Meiji Era (i867-x912), began to fall seriously behind during World War I. Cf. KAZUSHm OuiAWA El
AL., THE GRowTH RATE Op THE JAPANESE Ecovo. t SicE 1878, at 21-23 (1957).
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on birth control in Japan in 1922; a more liberal Japanese Government.tolerated and
even assisted the movement for a brief period centering in i936; by 1937, the mn&v-
ment has been suppressed entirely by the militarists.
The family-limitation movement revived immediately, after the Surrender, but
met with the unexpected hostility of the early Occupation 8  Mrs. Sanger, invited
to Japan by the newspaper Yomiuri, was denied an entry permit by SCAP. Pegsi-
mistic reports on Japan's natural resources by the demographers Thompson and
Whelpton and by the geographer Ackerman were. suppressed temporarily for. in-
clusion of birth control among the possible solutions Japan might adopt 7 Educa-
tional books and motion pictures illustrating contraceptive techniques were banned
by SCAP as obscene-which they usually were, by small-town American standards.
When the statistics of the baby boom became known, -however, the Occupation
modified its position in response to near-panic among the Japanese. Public advocacy
of birth control by Americans remained under the ban, but the Japanese Govern-
ment was permitted to set up a Population Problem Council under the Cabinet. In
the same year (1948), the Occupation permitted introduction of a Eugenic Pro-
tection Law (Yfisei-hogo-hd) into the Japanese Diet, where it passed handily.
This law, as amended and broadened since its original passage, has become te
Magna Charta of Japanese family limitation. Translations from its text may be
found in several of the sources cited in this essay. The principal amendments and
implementations have been summarized by Tachi:38
In 1949, the Government gave permission to manufacture several kinds of contra-
ceptives, and contraception gradually became popular but cases of induced abortion tended
to grow at leaps and bounds. In order to prevent dangerous black market induced
abortions, therefore, the Eugenic Protection Law was amended in May, 1949, to widely
legalize induced abortion. Then, in 1951
.
, the Government decided on a policy to dis-
seminate contraception among the people for the purpose of preventing unnecessary in-
duced abortions with a view to protecting maternal health. In 1952, the Eugenic Pro-
tection Law was revised again to simplify procedures for legal induced abortion, while
new regulations providing for guidance in contraception were added. In the same year,
the Population Problems Inquiry Council was created under the Ministry of Welfare as an
advisory organ on population policies, and in 1954, the council adopted a resoluti6 n
requiring the Government to take steps to disseminate family planning upon the public.
In accordance with this resolution, the Government decided in the same year to enforce
a policy to diffuse the knowledge of family planning with the aim to control the popula-
tion increase. The Ministry of Welfare exerted efforts for individual and group guidance
" KITAOKA, op. cit. stepra note 27, at 45, ascribes this hostility to Roman Catholic members of the
Occupation hierarchy; but TERAo, op. cit. supra note 17, at 21, observes that: "Had GHQ expressed
some opinion favoring birth-control, not a few of the Japanese would have suspected the intention,
and thought that the Allied Powers were aiming at the gradual disappearance of the race, or in other
words, the genocide."
" E. A. AcKER^MAN, JAPAN's NATURAL RESOURCES AND THEIR RELATION. TO JAPAN's EcoNOMIC FUTURE
('953).
8 MiNoEu TACHI, POPULATION PROBLEMS OF TODAY 5 (1958). An earlier National Eugenic Law,
modeled precisely on German Nazi doctrines, had been adopted in 194 o , but lapsed following the
Surrender. TERAo, op. cit. supra note 17, at 13 et seq.
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in the techniques of family planning chiefly through the 845 eugenic protection consulta-
tion centers throughout the country while private organizations, too, provided generous
cooperation in this respect.
The sale of contraceptive devices is legal in Japan, as is the dissemination of
detailed contraceptive information. Contraceptives are distributed gratis to the poor.
Daily newspapers and women's magazines, some with circulation in the millions,
have published contraceptive information widely, including simple graphic illustra-
tions that would be banned from the mails by the United States Post Office Depart-
ment. Abortions have been legalized for a number of reasons, including the semi-
economic. Thus chapter three of article fourteen legalizes abortion by licensed
physicians with the consent of both spouses, "if the continuance of pregnancy or
the delivery seems remarkably injurious to the health of the mother due to her
physical or financial condition."3 Over ninety-nine per cent of all legal abortions
are performed under this provision.
Article three of the Eugenic Protection Law 4° goes further, and legitimizes
sterilization ("eugenic operations") for a number of reasons relating to the health
of the mother and the transmission of heredity defects. It does not mention eco-
nomic causes.
Survey research, sponsored mainly by the Mainichi newspapers, indicates
that a large and growing percentage of Japanese families with wives below fifty
years of age, particularly urban families, admit the practice of some form of contra-
ception, as is shown in table eight. Of these, forty-four per cent give economic
reasons for so doing. Other surveys show declines in the percentage of parents who
expect to be supported by their children in old age from fifty-four (x95o) to forty-
three (i955) and thirty-nine (I959), and in the desired number of children per family
from nearly four (1947) to less than two (i959).*4 (The prewar average was 4.7')
Further indications of the popularity of the family-limitation movement have been
the receipt of an official award by Mrs. Sanger from the Japanese Government, the
election of "the Margaret Sanger of Japan" (Mrs. Kanju Kato) to the Upper House
of the Japanese Diet by the largest vote in Japanese electoral history, and the choice
of Tokyo as the scene of the Fifth International Conference on Planned Parent-
hood.2
It is, nevertheless, apparent that abortion has been more effective than contracep-
don in reducing the Japanese birth rate. The proportion of reported abortions to
3* KrrAoxA, op. cit. supra note 27, at 52. (Emphasis added.) Another provision of the same art. 14
states that consent of the father is not required "where [he] is unknown or is incapable of expressing his
will, or where [he] had ceased to exist for the person in question after the conception has taken place."
TAxuamt, op. cit. supra note 17, at 269.
'
0 Reprinted in full in KrrAoKA, op. dt. supra note 27, at 55 et seq.
Cf GI. FAcTS ABOuT THE POPULATION OF JAPAN: LATEST DATA AND ANALYSIS 15 (Mainichi Newspapers,
Population Problems Research Council Series No. 17, X956); THomPsoN, op. cit. supra note 28, at 70;
KrAOKA, op. cit. supra note 27, at'59 et seq.
" KrrAoA, op. cit. supra note 27, at 54 et seq.; TERAo, op. cit. supra note 17, at 32 et seq.
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TABLE VIII
PROPORTION OF MAMlUED COUPLES PRACTICING SOME METHOD OF CONTRACEPTION,
JAPAN, 1950-57 (PERCENTAGE)
Six Largest Other Urban
Year All Japan Cities Places Rural
1950 ............ 19.5 23.7 23.6 17.4
1952 ............ 26.3 34.8 31.1 22.1
1954 ............ 33.2 .... 37.2a .... 30.4
1955 ............ 33.6 37.7 I 34.0 31.9
1957 ............ 39.2 44.5 39.5 36.1
NOrz: - All urban places.
Souners: Klazxan5 JnusxaoMxt Sauewou, JiN5x HAxusHo [PoPuLArToe Paosrxms InQuITr Councr., WET-raR MnsiTar
PoPuLATioN Wmarr PAPER] 84 (1959).
reported births has risen above seventy per cent.43 Although many reported abortions
involve illegal reasons, 4 the number of unreported (illegal) abortions has been
estimated to equal or to exceed the number of reported abortions legal and illegal.
The importance of sterilization is of a much lower order of magnitude, although
the proportion of unreported (illegal) sterilizations is estimated as much higher
than in the case of abortion. The Muramatsu-Ogino study mentioned in the last
footnote estimated the total number for 1953 as between 134,ooo and i72,ooo, although
less than 33,ooo were reported. Reported numbers of abortions and sterilizations
are presented together in table nine.
TABLE IX
REPORTED ABORTIONS AND STERILIZATIONS, JAPAN, 1949-56 (THOUSANDS OF OPERATIONS)
Sterilizations
Year Abortionsa (both sexes)
1949 ............. 246 (9) 5.7
1950 ............. 489 (21) 11.4
1951 ............. 638 (30) 16.2
1952 ............. 798 (40) 22.4
1953 ............. 1068 (57) 32.6
1954 ............. 1143 (65) 38.1
1955 ............. 1170 (68) 43.3
1956 ............. 1159 (70) 44.5
1957 ............. 1122 (72) 44.4
NoTE: = Tipureslnlparentheses are reported abortions as percentages of live births.
SouRCE :6SEXM5 JnS-OMONDAJ SHI-OIAX, JIXE5 HM=1o [PoPULA .moN PROBLEMS INQUmRY COUNcm, WELFARE MIIISTRY,
PoxuLamor Wrn PPnER] 72 (1959).
"JNX5 HAxUSHO 44 estimates that 40% of pregnancies end in abortion.
"KrrAoxA, op. cit. supra note 27, at 54, reports the following illegal reasons as mentioned fre-
quently by patients: pregnancy in old age, too short an interval after prior childbirth, too much care for
older children, nso desire for more children, difficult living conditions (especially housing), necessity for
work outside the home.
'" Mrs. Taeuber reports a study by Muramatsu and Ogino estimating the total number of abortions at
from z,8oo,ooo to 2,3o0,0oo in a year (953) when reported abortions were i,zoo,ooo. TAEUBER, op. cit.
supra note 17, at 276.
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
There is no doubt that contraception and abortion have been the instrumentalities
of the halving of the Japanese birth rate from thirty-four to seventeen per thousand
population in a decade. It is, nevertheless, interesting to note as is shown in table
ten, that the decline of the birth rate from baby boom to "empty kindergarten" levels
has proceeded at a fairly smooth rate, regardless of the ease or difficulty of contra-
ception and abortion, save for the two years 195o-5i. As the table shows, more
than half of the total cumulative decline in the birth rate from its 1947 high was
already achieved by the end of i95i, before the "easy abortion" amendment to the
Eugenic Protection Law was passed. Furthermore, the decline of the abortion rate
since 1955 was not accompanied by any increase in the birth rate. This evidence
suggests to the present writers that the importance of the particular institutions of
easy legal contraception and abortion in lowering the Japanese birth rate may have
been exaggerated, and that other institutions (e.g., postponement of marriage, con-
tinence within marriage, illegal contraception, illegal abortion) might have brought
close approximations to the same results in a Japan more affected by western
prudery.
TABLE X
DECLINE OF THE JAPANESE BIRTH RATE, 1947-58 (PER THOUSAND)
Decline
Year Crude Birth
Rate Simple Cumulative
1947 ................ .30 ... .
1948 ................. 33.52 0.78 0.78
- 1949 ................. 32.97 0.55 1.33
1950 ................. 28.10 4.87 6.20
1951 ................. 25.29 2.81 9.01
1952 ................. 23.37 1.92 10.93
1953 ................. 21.48 1.89 12.82
1954 ................. 20.05 1.43 14.25
1955 ................. 19.39 0.66 14.91
1956 ................. 18.45 0.94 15.85
1957 ................. 17.20 1.25 17.10
1958 (preliminary)... 17.93 -0.73 16.37
SOURCZ XKsKas5 JL'Nx5MONDAI SnwXairAT, JiNrSI xrVSHO [PoPuLArxoh" Aonrxms IxQvmr Comc,. WELrANm MIzar,
PoPuLToi WrnmE PAPrn] 142 (1959).
CONCLUSION
Save for the cost of abortion (especially repeated abortion) on female health,
these statistics cumulate to what is for the economist an optimistic picture of Japan
approaching a stable population level at the highest living standards in its history.
This optimism is enhanced by the fact that national income per gainfully occupied
worker doubled in only eight years (1947-55) of reconstruction and recovery." Even
lacking the salutary experience of similar easy optimism in the 192o's and 193o's,
" O wKAwA, op. cit. supra note 35, at 234.
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however,4 T we should probably temper our sanguine projections with three caveats-
one for the near and two for the long-term future.
During the middle i96o's, Japan faces what may be its last population convulsion,
but a severe one for all that. The baby-boom babies will come of working age to.
the number of some ii,7ooooo in the decade ending in 1965, and 8,ooo,ooo are ex-
pected to be added to the labor force itself.48 Will there be jobs for them at anything:
like the present wage rates of large-scale industry? If not, there will be a wave of
unemployment, open or disguised,, with every prospect of social upheaval or even
revolution.
This problem the Japanese Government has chosen to meet in advance by long--
range planning-with results, as yet, uncertain.49  Much depends on the state of'
the world economy and of world trade in the crucial period 1961-1967. During-
these years, Japan must increase exports sharply to pay for the imports required to.
distribute her postwar standard of living over her larger adult population.
Japan's two longer-term population problems, assuming continued peace, are-
a possible resurgence of the birth rate and the rising proportion of aged persons.
incapable of self-support. Japanese, traditionally fond of children, may raise birth
rates voluntarily once again (without waiting for affluence as per our theory), since-
the housing situation is continuing its belated recovery from wartime damage. If so,,
the low birth rates of the i95o's may be seen eventually in retrospect as postpone-
ments of children to the next decade. Preliminary reports for 1958 point vaguely-
in this direction. They show a slight but ominous rise in the crude birth rate as is.
shown in table ten, and also increases in both marriage rates and fertility rates of
recent marriages. ° This apparent rebound may be a freak occurrence or a statisticaL
error; if it is real and significant no one-knows with certainty how far it may-
proceed.
As Japanese life expectancy continues to increase, the proportions of aged persons-
to those of working age will rise. Taking fifteen and sixty years as "working age-
limits," the percentage of persons sixty years of age and over to those of working:
age was 12.8 in 1955. It is expected to double by i99o and reach 32.5 by 2ooo.1 '
While this rise will be offset by the anticipated decline in the proportion of de--
pendent children, it presents, nevertheless, a problem that Japan has faced no more-
resolutely than has the United States, and that Japan's comparative poverty leaves.
it less well equipped to solve.
"' These optimistic forecasts of the interwar period are discussed by Mrs. Taeuber in Japan and Korea:-
Population Growth, in WILLIAmSON & BUTTRICK, op. cit. supra note 2, ch. ii.
48 JAPANESE NAT'L COMXM'N FOR UNESCO, op. cit. supra note 24, at 203, 206.
"'The Japanese Government has prepared EcoNoMsIc PLANNING AGENCY, A Nw LONG-RANGE Eco-
NOMIC PLAN OF JAPAN (1958), covering the fiscal years 1958-62, and in some sectors extending to x975-
This plan is currently (Spring 596o) in process of revision in the direction of greater freedom of
trade and a larger role for price adjustments.
8 0 
MINORU TACHI & Tosmo KURODA, TRENDS IN POPULATION GROWTH AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT-
IN JAPAN 13-15 (1959), are among the Japanese population specialists inclined toward pessimism as to.
the possible significance of the 1958 figures.
" JAPANESE NAT'L COMM'N FOR UNESCO, Op. cit. sipra note 24, at 242.
